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Abstract
According to conventional wisdom, ﬁscal policy is more effective under a ﬁxed than under
a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. In this paper we reconsider the transmission of shocks to gov-
ernment spending across these regimes within a standard New Keynesian model of a small open
economy. Because of the stronger emphasis on intertemporal optimization, the New Keynesian
frameworkrequiresa precise speciﬁcation of ﬁscal and monetarypolicies, and their interaction, at
both short and long horizons. We derive an analytical characterizationof the transmission mecha-
nism of expansionary spending policies under a peg, showing that the long-term real interest rate
always rises in response to an increase in government spending if inﬂation rises initially. This
response drives down private demand even though short-term real rates fall. As this need not be
the case under ﬂoating exchange rates, the conventional wisdom needs to be qualiﬁed. Under
plausible medium-term ﬁscal policies, government spending is not necessarily less expansionary
under ﬂoating exchange rates.
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Long-term rates, New Keynesian models
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One of the most popular pieces of wisdom in economic policy is the idea that ﬁscal policy is more
effective in a ﬁxed exchangerate regime or a currency union, relative to a regime of ﬂexible exchange
rates. In this paper, we revisit the theoretical foundations of the conventional wisdom on the relative
effectiveness of ﬁscal policy under alternative exchange rate regimes, using a standard New Keyne-
sian model of a small open economy. We do so by focusing our analysis on the inherent link between
the macroeconomic effects of short-run stimulus and private expectations about medium-run mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy developments. We do not, however, deviate from the assumption of perfect
credibility of the peg, and we do not consider the case of prospective deﬁcit monetization, discussed
in an important contribution by Dornbusch (1980).1 Rather, we look at plausible monetary and ﬁscal
policy regimes, assumed to remain in place over the medium run.
Speciﬁcally, the New Keynesian model calls attention to the real long-term rate as a core indicator of
the overall stance of stabilization policy: for private demand to increase in response to a shock, this
rate must fall; see Woodford (2003). Then, as stressed by Corsetti, Meier, and M¨ uller (2009), under
the expectation hypothesis, long-term rates reﬂect the entire path of (current and future anticipated)
monetary and ﬁscal decisions, via the effects of the latter on short-term rates over time. Based on
this consideration, in this paper we are able to derive sharp predictions regarding the macroeconomic
dynamics following any given ﬁscal expansion in a small open economy, as a function of the regimes
governing the evolution of ﬁscal policy and monetary/exchange rate policy.
The main conclusion of our analysis is that ﬁscal policy is not necessarily less effective under ﬂexible
exchange rates. With the central bank’s behavior approximated by a Taylor rule, ﬁrst, a high degree
of monetary accommodation can greatly amplify the expansionary effects of ﬁscal stimulus under
ﬂexible rates, up to making ﬁscal stimulus approximately as powerful as under a peg. Second, a
plausible regime of medium-run ﬁscalconsolidationin which,after the initial stimulus, both spending
and taxes are adjusted so as to stabilize debt, can actually undermine the ranking according to the
conventional wisdom. The transmission mechanism for the case of a ﬂoat is analyzed in detail by
Corsetti et al. (2009), henceforth CMM, who show that, everything else equal, the long-term real
interest rate tends to fall if agents anticipate a contraction in government spending in the near future,
boosting private and thus aggregate demand. A speciﬁc contribution of this paper is to show that a
fall in long real rates in response to a ﬁscal expansion is not possible under a peg, whether or not
agents anticipate spending cuts in the medium term.
1According to Dornbusch, the prediction that a ﬁscal expansion causes the exchange rate to appreciate is an unappealing
feature of the Mundell-Fleming model, in apparent contrast with the practical experience in policymaking. To address
this issue, Dornbusch encompasses medium-term monetary developments in the model, focusing on the case in which
government expansions in the short run foreshadow deﬁcit monetization over the medium run. The anticipation of a future
monetary expansion already weakens the exchange rate in the short run.
1Indeed, we provide a simple analytical characterization of the effect – in the initial period – of tem-
porary shocks (including ﬁscal ones) on the long-term rate in a regime of limited exchange rate ﬂex-
ibility. Namely, assuming complete ﬁnancial markets and additively separable utility for simplicity,
we show that, up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, under a peg the long-term real rate moves one-to-one
with the initial (unexpected)change in the CPI. In other words, the initial bout of inﬂation in response
to a ﬁscal expansion approximates the rise in long-term real rates on impact. In turn, this rise in long-
term real rates drives down consumption demand proportionately.2 The crowding out of consumption
thus reduces the multiplier. Different outcomes, instead, are possible under a ﬂoat, depending on the
interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy in the medium run.
A corollary of our analysis is that, under a peg, short-term real rates and long-term real rates co-
move negatively in response to a ﬁscal shock: the latter necessarily rise on impact, even if the former
fall one-to-one with the rate of inﬂation. This characterization of the transmission mechanism casts
doubts on the argument underlying the so-called Walters critique.3 According to this critique, under
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, exogenous cyclical shocks (including ﬁscal shocks) that cause inﬂation
are bound to be ampliﬁed by the implied endogenous pro-cyclical movements in the real interest
rate. A ﬁxed exchange rate regime, so the argument goes, is therefore inherently destabilizing. It is
apparent that this argument relies on the maintained (but incorrect) assumption that real rates move
necessarily in the same direction over the whole maturity structure.
We carry out a robustness analysis by enriching the baseline New Keynesian small open economy
framework with features capturing ﬁnancial imperfections and frictions. After establishing that our
main conclusions hold under incomplete ﬁnancial markets as well, we study the case of economies
with limited assetmarketparticipation—a fraction ofhouseholdsare excludedfromﬁnancialmarkets,
possibly because of (non-modeled) costs of access to them. Fiscal stabilization is typically motivated
by pointing out that a signiﬁcant fraction of households may face ﬁnancial constraints, making mon-
etary policy less potent. We show that our main results carry over to this environment as well, where
ﬁscal policy becomes overall more effective.
Overall, our results provide a fresh perspective on the relative merits of ﬁscal policy as a stabilization
tool under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchangerates, and possibly also a rationale for why ﬁscal policy is used
as an actual stabilization tool under both exchange rate regimes. While for analytical purposes we
focus on the transmission of exogenousinnovations in government spending, our results are informa-
tive as to how an endogenous policy response to shocks is likely to affect the economy under a peg
or ﬂoat. Speciﬁcally, to the extent that variations in government spending in response to shocks are
2The constant of proportionality depends on the curvature of the utility function. While this condition does not hold
exactly if markets are incomplete, or preferences are not additive separable, the main insight of a positive relation between
initial unexpected inﬂation and the movement in the long-term rate remains valid in more general model speciﬁcations.
3See Walters (1992) and Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998).
2partly reversed in the future, they are likely to be a stabilization tool at least as effective under ﬂoating
as under ﬁxed exchange rates.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the conventional wisdom based on the tradi-
tional Mundell-Fleming model. Section 3 presents our New Keynesian (NK) model of a small open
economy. Section 4 provides a brief overview of the linearized equilibrium conditions. Section 5
reconsiders the conventional wisdom in the NK framework, focusing on the special case of an ex-
ogenous autoregressive ﬁscal disturbance. Section 6 derives analytical results regarding the ﬁscal
transmission mechanism. Section 7 carries out experiments for a general speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy
with endogenous correction of both taxes and spending. Section 8 explores the robustness of our
results in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. Section 9 concludes.
2 The conventional wisdom
The conventional wisdom typically refers to the textbook version of the Mundell-Fleming model as
illustrated graphically by Figure 1. Aggregate demand, Y , is measured against the horizontal axis,
andthe nominalinterestrate is measuredagainstthe verticalaxis. The downwardslopingline is the IS
curve, derived from the equilibrium condition that investment equals savings, and expressing output
as a declining function of the interest rate. The position of the IS curve depends on the level of the
exchange rate: with preset prices, a nominal (=real) depreciation moves the IS to the right, through a
positive competitiveness effect on real export. In the background of this curve, the exchange rate is
determined by the uncoveredinterest parity condition—so that a ﬁxed exchangerate requires equality
between the domestic and the foreign interest rate in nominal terms. Under a ﬂoating rate, one needs
to makeanassumptionaboutagents’expectationsoffuture exchangerates. Withoutlossofgenerality,
for our purpose it is analytically convenient to assume that the exchangerate follows a random walk.4
Money demand is a positive function of output, and a negative function of the nominal interest rate.
In a small open economy (foreign interest rate and prices are given), a spending expansionhas a large
multiplier effect on output under ﬁxed exchange rates, while it just crowds out net exports one-to-
one under ﬂexible exchange rates. The reason for these differential results is a different degree of
monetary accommodation across the two regimes. Under a peg, the central bank is committed to
stemming any change in the demand for money that may compromise the sustainability of the ofﬁcial
exchangerate parity. Hencethere mustbe full monetary accommodation: if governmentinterventions
drive up employment and income, households and ﬁrms raise their demand for cash, and the central
bank has to raise its money supply by the same amount. If it did not, the interest rate would rise, and
a higher interest rate would tend to make the currency appreciate (via the uncovered interest parity











Figure 1: Expansion of government spending in Mundell-Fleming model (textbook version).
condition), contradicting its commitment to maintaining the currency peg. This implies a multiplier
larger than one for the case of a peg.
Under a ﬂexible rate regime, instead, the central bank is not committed to any particular exchange
rate parity. If a spending expansion were successful in raising employment, incomes and therefore
the demand for money, there would be an upward pressure on interest rates that would in turn make
the currency appreciate. But a stronger currency reduces aggregate demand and income, by crowding
out net exports, and therefore counteracts the effects of the initial stimulus on interest rates. Since in
equilibrium there cannot be any upward pressure on the interest rate or the exchange rate, on impact
the latter must appreciate by enough to rule out any change in the level of aggregate demand, output,
and money demand. So, a governmentexpansionresults exclusivelyin nominaland real appreciation,
and a different composition of ﬁnal demand, with more public demand and fewer exports.5
Such sharp results are of course sensitiveto the parameterization of expectations. Assuming a station-
ary exchange rate, for instance, the impact appreciation of the exchange rate under a ﬂoating regime
would create expectations of depreciation in the future. In equilibrium, the domestic interest rate
would rise above the foreign one, with crowding out effects on domestic investment. The substance
of the analysis above would not be affected, but there would be some response in equilibrium policy
rates, and the composition of ﬁnal demand, whereby more government spending would imply both
lower net exports and lower investment. A further observation is that, encompassing price dynam-
ics in the model, the inﬂationary consequences of a spending expansion should be more pronounced
under a ﬁxed exchange rate.
The presumption that the degree of monetary accommodation is necessarily higher under a peg is
nonetheless controversial, even in the traditional literature. Implicit in the analysis by Dornbusch
(1980), for instance, is the notion that, in practice, monetary accommodation tends to be quite pro-
5Note that in this simple exercise monetary accommodation works through changes in the money supply: the interest
rate actually remains constant in both regimes. The analysis of the ﬂexible exchange rate regime is indeed typically carried
out under the assumption of a constant money supply.
4nounced under a ﬂoating regime—a position motivated by the empirical observation that the nominal
exchange rate tends to depreciate with ﬁscal expansions.6
3 A small open economy model
In the following we outline a New Keynesian small open economy model similar to Gal´ ı and Mona-
celli (2005) and Ghironi (2000). Our exposition follows CMM, except that, for clarity of exposition,
in our baseline scenario we assume complete international ﬁnancial markets. In a later section, we
consider alternative assumptions regarding the set of internationally traded assets and the fraction
of households that participate in domestic asset markets. Our exposition focuses on the domestic
economy and its interaction with the rest of the world, ROW, for short.7
3.1 Final Good Firms
The ﬁnal consumption good, Ct, is a composite of intermediate goods produced by a continuum of
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms both at home and abroad. We use j ∈ [0,1] to index intermediate
good ﬁrms as well as their products and prices. Final good ﬁrms operate under perfect competition
and purchase domestically produced intermediate goods, YH,t(j), as well as imported intermediate

































where σ measures the trade price elasticity, i.e., the extent of substitution between domestically pro-
duced goods and imports for a given change in the terms of trade. The parameter ǫ > 1 measures the
price elasticity across intermediate goods produced within the same country, while ω measures the
weight of imports in the production of ﬁnal consumption goods—a value lower than 1/2 corresponds
to home bias in consumption.
Expenditure minimization implies the following price indices for domestically producedintermediate
goods and imported intermediate goods, respectively,
PH,t =




















6See Corsetti, Meier, and M¨ uller (2010b) for recent evidence.
7Our small open economy can be interpreted as the limiting case within a two-country world of an economy that has a
relative size of zero; see De Paoli (2009).
5Regarding the ROW, we assume an isomorphic aggregation technology. Further, the law of one price
is assumed to hold at the level of intermediate goods such that
PF,tEt = P∗
t , (3.4)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate (the price of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency)
and P∗
t denotes the price index of imports measured in foreign currency. It corresponds to the foreign
price level, as imports account for a negligible fraction of ROW consumption. For future reference









respectively. Note thatwhile the lawof oneprice holdsthroughout,deviationsfrom purchasingpower
parity (PPP) are possible in the short run, due to home bias in consumption. Below we will consider
the dynamics of the model around a symmetric steady state such that PPP holds in the long run.
3.2 Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate goods are produced on the basis of the following production function: Yt(j) = Ht(j),
where Ht(j) measures the amount of labor employed by ﬁrm j.
Intermediate good ﬁrms operate under imperfect competition. We assume that price setting is con-
strained exogenously by a discrete time version of the mechanism suggested by Calvo (1983). Each
ﬁrm has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability 1 − ξ. Given this possibility, a




ξkρt,t+k [Yt,t+k(j)PH,t(j) − Wt+kHt+k(j)], (3.6)
where ρt,t+k denotes the stochastic discount factor and Yt,t+k(j) denotes demand in period t + k,
given that prices have been set optimally in period t. Et denotes the expectations operator.
3.3 Households
For our baseline scenario we assume that there is a representative household that ranks sequences of
consumption and labor effort, Ht =
  1

















We assume that the household trades a complete set of state-contingent securities with the rest of the
world. Letting Ξt+1 denote the payoff in units of domestic currency in period t + 1 of the portfolio
held at the end of period t, the budget constraint of the household is given by
WtHt + Υt − Tt − PtCt = Et {ρt,t+1Ξt+1} − Ξt, (3.8)
6where Tt and Υt denotes lump-sum taxes and proﬁts of intermediate good ﬁrms, respectively.
3.4 Monetary and ﬁscal policy
The speciﬁcation of monetary policy depends on the exchange rate regimes. Under ﬂexible exchange
rates, we assumethat the centralbanksets the nominalshort-term interest rate following a Taylor-type
rule:
log(Rt) = log(R) + φπ(ΠH,t − ΠH), (3.9)
where ΠH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1 measures domestic inﬂation and (here as well as in the following) vari-
ables without a time subscript refer to the steady-state value of a variable. In this case, the nominal
exchange rate is free to adjust in accordance with the equilibrium conditions implied by the model.
Note thatundera ﬂoat, severalmonetaryregimesare possibleandthe speciﬁcationof monetarypolicy
is key for our comparison of ﬁscal policy transmission under pegs and ﬂoats.
Under an exchange rate peg, the monetary authorities are required to adjust the policy rate so that the
exchange rate remains constant at its steady-state level. A feasible policy that ensures this as well as
equilibrium determinacy is given by:
log(Rt) = log(R∗
t) + φE log(Et/E), with φE > 0, (3.10)
see Ghironi (2000) and Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi (2007).
As regards ﬁscal and budget policy, we assume that government spending falls on an aggregate of
domestic intermediate goods only:
Gt =








We also posit that intermediate goods are assembled so as to minimize costs. Thus the price index for
government spending is given by PH,t. Government spending is ﬁnanced either through lump sum
taxes, Tt, or through issuance of nominal one-period debt, Dt. The period budget constraint of the
government reads as follows:
R−1
t Dt+1 = Dt + PH,tGt − Tt. (3.12)
Deﬁning Dr
t = Dt/Pt−1 as a measure for real, beginning-of-period, debt, and Tr
t = Tt/Pt as taxes
in real terms, we posit that ﬁscal policy is described by the following feedback rules from debt accu-
mulation to the level of spending and taxes:
Gt = (1 − ρ)G + ρGt−1 − ψGDRt + εt, TRt = ψTDRt, (3.13)
where εt measures an exogenous iid shock to government spending. The ψ-parameters capture the
responsiveness of spending and taxes to government spending and debt. Note that standard analyses
7of the ﬁscal transmission typically assume that ψG = 0. When taxes are lump-sum, Ricardian equiv-
alence obtains in this case, as the path of government spending is exogenously given, and the time
path of debt and taxes becomes irrelevant for the real allocation. Compared to this benchmark, allow-
ing for ψG > 0 fundamentally alters the ﬁscal transmission mechanism; see CMM. For once, strictly
speaking,Ricardian equivalencefails in this case,even when taxesare lump sum. A debt-ﬁnancedcut
in taxes dynamically leads to an adjustment in real spending, affecting the real allocation. Moreover,
the time proﬁle of adjustment affects the intertemporal price of consumption, with sharp implications
for macroeconomic dynamics. Below we analyze the ﬁscal transmission mechanism in light of these
considerations, contrasting results under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime with those obtained under a
pegged exchange rate regime.
3.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that ﬁrms and households behave optimally for given initial conditions, exoge-
nously given developments in the ROW, and government policies. Moreover, market clearing con-
ditions need to be satisﬁed. At the level of each intermediate good, supply must equal total demand























t denote the price index of domestic goods expressed in foreign currency and
ROW consumption, respectively. It is convenient to deﬁne an index for aggregate domestic output:
Yt =







. Substituting for Yt(j) using (3.14) gives the aggregate relationship












t + Gt. (3.15)











In what follows, we will consider a ﬁrst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions of the
model around a deterministic steady state with balanced trade, zero debt, zero inﬂation, and purchas-
ing power parity. Further, we consider only shocks that originate in the domestic economy and thus
do not affect the ROW.
4 Linearized equilibrium conditions
In this section we present a set of equilibrium conditions that can be used to approximate the equilib-
rium allocation in response to government spending shocks in the neighborhood of the steady state.
8In what follows, lower-case letters indicate percentage deviations from steady state, while a hat indi-
cates that such deviations are measured in percent of steady-state output. Details of the derivation can
be found in the appendix. Observe that under a ﬂoat and for an exogenously given path of govern-
ment spending, three equations are sufﬁcient to characterize the equilibrium: a dynamic IS equation,
the New Keynesian Phillips curve and a characterization of monetary policy.8 A three-equation rep-
resentation of the equilibrium is not possible for a richer speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy featuring an
endogenous feedback effect from debt to spending and/or in case of an exchange rate peg, however.
The dynamic IS equation is given by:
yt = Etyt+1 −
(1 − χ)̟
γ
(rt − EtπH,t+1) − Et∆ˆ gt+1, (4.1)
where πH,t denotes domestic (producer price) inﬂation and, according to our deﬁnition, ˆ gt denotes
the deviation of governmentspending from steady state measured in percent of steady-state output. χ
measures the governmentspending-to-output ratio in the steady state and ̟ = 1+ω(2−ω)(σγ −1).
The open-economy New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by










where κ = (1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)/ξ.
Either monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule (in which case the nominal
exchangerate is free to adjust) or monetary authorities adjust the policy rate so as to peg the exchange
rate to its steady-state level. Formally, we have:
rt = φππH,t, or rt = φEet. (4.3)
Note that variables pertaining to ROW are zero in terms of deviations from the steady state, as we
only consider shocks in the domestic economy.
The evolution of public debt, government spending and taxes is given by
β ˆ dr
t+1 = ˆ dr
t + χωst + ˆ gt − ˆ tr
t, (4.4)
ˆ gt = ρˆ gt−1 − ψG ˆ dr
t + εt, (4.5)
ˆ tr
t = ψT ˆ dr
t. (4.6)
In order to fully specify the equilibrium dynamics, we relate the nominal exchangerate to the dynam-
ics of output and inﬂation as follows. The deﬁnition of the terms of trade st = pH,t − pF,t and the
8This is often referred to as the canonical representation of the New Keynesian model (see, e.g., Gal´ ı and Monacelli
2005). As Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) abstract from government spending, our representation differs from theirs. Impor-
tantly, we prefer to represent the canonical form using output, rather than the output gap, in view of the fact that changes
in government spending also alter the natural level of output. Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2008) consider a very similar setup, but
focus on the special case where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the trade price elasticity are equal to one.
9law of one price imply
st = pH,t + et. (4.7)
Using the good market clearing condition and the risk sharing condition, we can express the terms of
trade in terms of output net of government spending:
1 − χ
γ
̟st = −(yt − ˆ gt). (4.8)
Given initial conditions and a sequence for innovations to government spending {εt}∞
t=0, equations
(4.1) to (4.8) pin down a sequence for nine variables {yt,rt,πH,t,pH,t, ˆ gt,et,st,ˆ tr
t,dt+1}∞
t=0, where
πH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1.
5 Revisiting the conventional wisdom: exchange rate regime and mon-
etary accommodation
In theoretical studies of the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal policy, government spending is typically
assumed to follow an exogenously given AR(1) process. In our framework, this assumption corre-
sponds to the case of no feedback from debt accumulation to spending, ψG = 0, which, as already
mentioned, implies Ricardian equivalence. While restrictive, this conventional parameterization pro-
vides a useful starting point to our analysis. Speciﬁcally, we take up the issue of how and why the
exchange rate regime may alter the transmission of an autoregressive spending shock matched by
higher lump-sum taxes. Using model simulations, we show that under standard assumptions on pa-
rameter values this basic exercise supports a particular aspect of the conventional wisdom, namely,
that ﬁscal policy is more effective in stimulating economic activity under a regime of ﬁxed exchange
rates than under ﬂoating exchange rates (and in which the central bank follows a Taylor rule).
For our numerical experiments we adopt the following parameter values: a period in the model corre-
sponds to one quarter. The discount factor β is set to 0.99. We assume that the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion, γ, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, take the value of one. The
trade price elasticity σ is setequalto unity aswell. Regardingopenness,we assumeω = 0.3. As price
rigidities are bound to play an important role in the transmission of government spending shocks, we
assume a fairly ﬂat Phillips curve. We do so by setting ξ = 0.9, a value that implies an average price
duration of 10 quarters. Note that such a parameterization prima facie is in conﬂict with evidence
from microeconomic studies such as Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Nonetheless, the choice of a
relatively high degree of price rigidities seems appropriate in the context of our framework, as we
abstract from several model features that would imply a ﬂatter Philips curve for any given value of ξ,
e.g., non-constant returns to scale in the variable factor of production or non-constant elasticities of




































Figure 2: Effect of government spending shock under peg and ﬂoat. Notes: dashed lines display re-
sponses under ﬂoating exchange rates assuming φπ = 1.5; solid lines display responses under pegged
exchange rates. Output and government spending are measured in percent of steady-state output.
Other variables are measured in percentage deviations from steady state (quarterly frequency). Hor-
izontal axes indicate quarters. Inﬂation and price level pertain to the price of domestically produced
goods.
demand.9 We also abstract from wage rigidities. We set ǫ = 11, such that the steady-state markup is
equal to 10 percent. In specifying monetary policy, we set φπ = 1.5. As discussed below, this param-
eter plays a central role in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks. Finally, the average share of government
spending in GDP is set to 20 percent, and we assume that the persistence of government spending is
ρ = 0.9.
Figure 2 displays the impulse responseto an exogenousincreasein governmentspendingby 1 percent
of GDP, for two economies that are identical in all respects except for the exchange rate (and thus
the monetary) regime. The responses of output and government spending are measured in percent of
steady-state output. The responses of the other variables are measured in percentage deviations from
steady state. The horizontal axes indicate quarters. The solid line refers to the exchange rate peg,
9SeeGal´ ı, Gertler, andL´ opez-Salido(2001) or Eichenbaum and Fisher(2007) for furtherdiscussion of how realrigidities
interact with nominal price rigidities in the context of the New Keynesian model. Note that the latter study also considers a
non-constant price elasticity of demand, which further increases the degree of real rigidities.
11while a dashed line marks the ﬂoating regime. The AR(1) process of government spending, identical
across exchange rate regimes, is shown in the upper left panel.
A ﬁrst notable result is that, in both regimes, the response of output (upper right panel) is positive, but
smaller than unity throughout. This is quite different from the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming
model for a small open economywith perfect capital mobility. As already discussedabove,according
to this model, government spending multipliers on output should be larger than one under a peg, zero
under a ﬂoat. Nonetheless, our results do agree with the conventional theory in relative terms: in
response to a positive (autoregressive) ﬁscal shock, GDP under the peg exceeds that under the ﬂoat
by approximately 25 percent on impact and the response of GDP remains stronger under the peg for
the ﬁrst couple of quarters after the initial impulse.
Further notable results shown in Figure 2 concern the response of inﬂation and the price level. On
impact, the response of domestic inﬂation (middle left panel) is positive irrespective of the exchange
rate regime. Yet, over time, inﬂation follows divergent paths. Under a peg, inﬂation falls below its
steady-state value after about 2 years. Under a ﬂoat, it remains positive throughout. This has direct
implications for the policy rate. Under a ﬂoat, the Taylor rule implies that the policy rate rises sharply
on impact, and only gradually reverts to its steady-state level. In nominal terms, the policy rate
under a ﬂoat thus remains above the constant nominal rate, dictated by the need to maintain the peg.
Moreover, as the Taylor principle is satisﬁed under a ﬂoat, real short-term interest rates (not shown)
rise above steady-state levels throughout the expansionary ﬁscal stance such that the long-term real
interest rate rises as well.
The differential behavior of inﬂation also maps into an apparent long run divergence in the price level
for domestically produced goods (pH,t), and thus in the nominal exchange rate. With the central
bank following a Taylor rule under a ﬂoat, monetary authorities adjust the policy rate in response to
the rate of growth in prices, and nominal prices drift to a permanently higher level. Since purchasing
powerparity(henceforthPPP)mustbesatisﬁedinthe long-run,thenominalexchangeratedepreciates
proportionallyovertime. So,underaﬂoat,boththe levelofdomesticpricesandthenominalexchange
rate display a unit root behavior.
When the exchange rate remains (credibly) pegged to its initial level, instead, long-run PPP requires
domestic prices to revert to their initial steady-state level. After an initial positive bout, inﬂation must
therefore fall below its steady-state rate. Intuitively, in the short run ﬁrms respond to the additional
demand from the government by raising prices. This makes them less competitive in the world mar-
ket. As government spending progressively reverts to its initial level, domestic ﬁrms need to re-gain
competitiveness: when re-optimizing prices, they do so by setting lower prices along with a falling
government demand.
Since in Figure 2 governmentspending is exogenouslydetermined and identical across exchangerate



































Figure 3: Effect of government spending shock under peg, and under a ﬂoat for alternative values of
φπ. Notes: dashed (dashed-dotted) lines display responses under ﬂoating exchange rates assuming
φπ = 1.01 (φπ = 3). Solid lines display responses under pegged exchange rates (these responses are
the same as in Figure 2); see Figure 2.
13regimes, larger output effects under a peg reﬂect a relatively more accommodativemonetary policy—
as maintained by conventional wisdom. Given the role that monetary accommodation plays in the
transmission mechanism, our results are somewhat sensitive to the parameterization of the monetary
policy rule under a ﬂoat, a point illustrated by Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, we contrast results for a
high and a low value of the coefﬁcient φπ. With a coefﬁcient as high as φπ = 3, implying that the
central bank targets near price stability, the impact multiplier is about 0.6 (dashed-dotted line)—a
result more in line with the traditional Mundell-Fleming view of relatively weak output effects of
government spending under a ﬂoat. Conversely, with a lower coefﬁcient φπ = 1.01, indexing a mild
reactivity of the central bank to current inﬂation, the impact multiplier under a ﬂoat is very close to
that under a peg (cumulative multipliers, obtained by summing up the output effects over time, are
actually larger).
In light of the above results, we can rephrase the key lesson from the conventional wisdom: since the
effectiveness of ﬁscal policy depends on the degree of monetary accommodation, comparing ﬁscal
transmission across exchange rate regimes requires a precise speciﬁcation of how monetary policy is
and will be conducted. In this respect, the New Keynesian model provides a clear and transparent
framework for doing so.
6 Inspecting the role of long-term real interest rates
To analyze more closely how the transmission of ﬁscal shocks is bound to depend on the interaction
of ﬁscal and monetary policy over different time horizons, we now turn to a simple analytical charac-
terization of ﬁscal transmission under a ﬂoat (cum Taylor rule) and under a peg. The main insight is
that ﬁscal policy cannot be modeled without specifying a medium and long-term policy framework.
Relative to the Mundell-Fleming world, New Keynesiananalysis provides a more suitable framework
for this purpose, as it assigns a much greater role to optimal intertemporal allocation by households
in response to changes in relative prices, and most notably to the path of real interest rates.
In the baseline NK model, the optimal path of consumptionis characterizedby the consumptionEuler









      
≡¯ rt
, (6.1)
where we have used the fact that the economy is stationary, and thus always reverts to the steady
state (i.e., lims→∞ ct+s = 0). Equation (6.1) shows that, in terms of deviations from the steady state,
current consumption is determined by expectations over the entire path of future ex-ante real interest
rates. Since the expectation hypothesis holds in the model, the latter can be interpreted as a measure
14of the real return on a bond of inﬁnite duration, i.e., as a measure of the long-term real interest rate.10
It is easy to see how the long-term real rate synthesizes ﬁscal and monetary interactions across all
time horizons, in response to ﬁscal (as well as to any other types of) shocks (see CMM). As already
mentioned, under a ﬂoat, monetary policy is not constrained by the need to bring the price level back
to its initial steady-state level in the long run. With a Taylor rule in place, the monetary stance in
response to a ﬁscal expansion is contractionary in both the short and the long run, to a degree that
depends on the parameterization of the coefﬁcient φπ. Since the increase in spending causes inﬂation
to remain persistently positive, short-term rates are expected to remain above or at their steady-state
value over time, implying a rise in long rates on impact. In Appendix C we show formally that under
a ﬂoat, long-term rates always increase for plausible parameter values, as long as ψG = 0.
Consider nowthe case of a peg. As shown in Figure 2, under a currency peg, monetary policy appears
to be more accommodativein the short run, since in real terms short-term interest rates fall one-to-one
with the rise in inﬂation. By the same token, however, short real rates rise in the medium and the long
run, when, for an unchanged nominal exchange rate, purchasing power parity drives inﬂation into
negative territory (in deviations from the steady state). Given the dynamics of inﬂation displayed in
Figure 2, for instance, real short-term rates initially fall below steady state, but become positive after
about 8 quarters.
This observation raises the issue of determining in which direction the long-term rate moves on im-
pact. Under our simplifying assumptions (a small open economy, constant foreign variables), it is
possible to provide a simple analytical insight on this question. Recall that under complete ﬁnancial
markets, the economy is stationary and always reverts to the steady state after a temporary increase in
domestic government spending. As PPP holds in the long run, limt→∞ Pt = P∗ under an exchange
rate peg: in the long run, the domestic price level is pinned down by the foreign price level. It follows
that
 ∞
t=0 πt = 0. At the same time, the domestic interest rate is pegged to the foreign one, the latter









      
=0
+π0 = π0.
Hence, on impact the response of the real long-term interest rate is equal to the initial, unanticipated
change in CPI inﬂation (the future evolution of inﬂation is not relevant). As the initial effect of an
increase in government spending on inﬂation is positive, the long-term rate increases, and consump-
tion cannot but decline. Moreover, a positive differential between domestic and foreign long-term
10The long-term real interest rate is also –via risk sharing – tightly linked to the real exchange rate: −γct = qt = ¯ rt (see
appendix). Hence, movements in the long-term interest rate may simultaneously rationalize changes in consumption and
the real exchange rate. Speciﬁcally, CMM discuss how the expected path of future government spending alters the behavior
of long-term real interest rates and thus the short-run adjustment to an exogenous innovation in government spending.
15real rates causes the exchange rate to appreciate in real terms.
It is worth stressing that the above result has a number of implications for the literature on macroeco-
nomic adjustment and stabilization policy under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. A point in case con-
cerns the so-called Walters critique. This starts from the observationthat, holding the nominalinterest
rate constant, the inﬂationary effects of a positive demand shock translate into a fall in the short-term
real interest rate. The endogenous movement in the real interest rate, the argument goes, is expan-
sionary: it boosts demand further, rather than stabilizing it. In its extreme (perhaps caricature-like)
form, the Walters critique states that a small open economy pursuing a currency peg or participating
in a currency union becomes unstable, since shocks are ampliﬁed by procyclical movements in the
monetary stance.
The traditional counterargument points out that, with positive domestic inﬂation, rising prices would
eventually crowd out exports, naturally stabilizing demand through the real exchange rate channel.
The modern paradigm clariﬁes a deeper issue. As shown above, under a peg, the long-run real rates,
which drive privatedemand,actually rise one-to-one with the initial boutof inﬂation. While the short-
run inﬂationary consequences of a positive demand shock simultaneously reduce short-term rates in
real terms, these are not directly relevant for private spending decisions.
Note that a reference to the effects of rising prices on competitiveness is still appropriate in the
modern framework: competitiveness is the economic force behind PPP. What the New Keynesian
model emphasizes is that one cannot contrast the real exchange rate channel and the interest rate
channel,treating them as independentof each other. In equilibrium, they both shapethe intertemporal
price relevant for private consumption/saving decisions.
7 Overturning the conventional wisdom: the medium-term ﬁscal
framework
The role of intertemporal prices in the transmission of ﬁscal policy stressed above naturally points to
the importance of broadening the analysis so as to encompass general speciﬁcations of the medium-
term framework—beyond the case of ψG = 0. To explore this new direction of the analysis, in what
follows we refer to CMM and contrast results for ψG = 0 and ψG = 0.02, while setting ψT = 0.02;
compare equation (3.13). Note that with a positive ψG, an expansionof governmentspendingleads to
an endogenousadjustment of spending over time. From a quantitative point of view, our assumptions
imply that government spending is cut, and taxes are increased, by 0.02 basis points for every 1
percent increase in government debt (all measured in units of steady-state output).
For economies with ﬂoating exchangerates, the relevanceof debt stabilization for the effectivenessof
ﬁscal stimulus cannot be overstated. CMM analyze in detail the implications of endogenousdynamic
cuts in spending, dubbed “spendingreversals,” and showthat the spending multiplier on consumption









































Figure 4: Effect of government spending shock with spending reversals: peg vs ﬂoat. Notes: solid
(dashed) lines display responses for peg (ﬂoat); output, consumption and government spending are
measured in percent of steady-state output. Other variables are measured in percentage deviations
from steady state. Horizontal axes indicate quarters. Inﬂation and price level pertain to the price of
domestically produced goods.
may be positive on impact: consumption demand is actually crowded in; the response of output is
therefore larger. The transmission mechanism is analogous to the one discussed under the peg in
the previous section. Following the same logic as before, we focus on the response of inﬂation.
The rate of inﬂation, positive in the short run, turns negative over time (relative to the steady state)
in anticipation of spending cuts, and thus even before these cuts are actually implemented. This is
because, with sticky prices, forward-looking ﬁrms optimally adjust prices downward ahead of the
fall in demand. Since lower inﬂation means lower policy rates, relative to the case of ψG = 0, a
spending expansion in the short run may actually be accompanied by a fall (not a rise) in the long-
term interest rate, crowding in private demand and boosting output more than one-for-one on impact.
As an implication, the exchange rate depreciates, instead of appreciating. This is consistent with a
recent body of evidence for economies that have adopted ﬂoating exchange rates (see the discussion
in Corsetti et al. 2010b).
For our purposes, the CMM case of a spending reversal is especially relevant because their transmis-
17sion mechanism sharply differs across exchange rate regimes. Figure 4 reports impulse responses for
the ﬂoat (dashed lines) and the peg (solid lines), for government spending shocks characterized by
reversals (the endogenous behavior of spending over time is shown in the upper left panel of the ﬁg-
ure). The results contrast sharply with those shown in Figure 2, computed in the absence of spending
reversals. In particular, the output response,shown in the upper right panel, is apparently at odds with
the conventional wisdom: for the ﬁrst two years the output response is now larger under a ﬂoat than
under a peg.
While the regime of debt consolidation (with reversals) is quite consequentialfor the short-run output
effects under a ﬂoat, it plays no quantitatively important role under a peg. This is consistent with
our analytical characterization of the transmission under a peg, according to which—on impact—
the long-term real rate always rises with impact inﬂation—irrespective of the exact path of future
short-term real rates, and thus irrespective of the type and intensity of debt consolidation.
These results add an important dimension to the conventional wisdom on ﬁscal transmission across
exchange rate regimes. Not only does the relative effectiveness of ﬁscal policy vary with the relative
degree of monetary accommodation across regimes, but holding the degree of monetary accommoda-
tion constant, the ranking is also sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the medium-term ﬁscal outlook.
8 Robustness and extensions: the case of incomplete ﬁnancial markets
So far, we have developed our analysis under the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets. We
now explore to what extent our results are sensitive to ﬁnancial frictions. In this section, we explore
this issue under two alternative assumptions regarding the structure of ﬁnancial markets. First, we
relax the assumption that ﬁnancial markets are complete at the international level and allow for trade
in nominally non-contingent bonds only. Second, we assume that, in addition, access to domestic
ﬁnancial markets is restricted. Speciﬁcally, we assume that only a subset of the population has access
to asset markets. Households without access consume their disposable income in each period. That
setup is similar to the closed-economy variants of Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007) and Bilbiie,
Meier, and M¨ uller (2008).
8.1 Model setup
Our model is amended by positing that, out of a continuum of households in [0,1] residing in our
small open economy, a fraction 1−λ are asset holders, indexed by a subscript ‘A’. These households
own the ﬁrms and may trade one-period bonds both domestically and internationally. The remaining
households (a fraction λ of the total) do not participate at all in asset markets, i.e., they are ‘non-asset
holders.’ They are indexed by subscript ‘N’.
18A representative asset-holding household chooses consumption, CA,t, and supplies labor, HA,t, to

















subject to the period budget constraint
R−1
t At+1 + R−1
F,tBt+1/Et + PtCA,t = At + Bt/Et + WtHA,t − Tt + Υt. (8.2)
where At and Bt are one-period bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively.
Rt and RF,t denote the gross nominal interest rates on both bonds. Ponzi schemes are ruled out by
assumption.
Weassumethattheinterestratepaidorearnedonforeignbondsbydomestichouseholdsisdetermined
by the exogenous world interest rate, R∗
t, plus a ‘spread’ that decreases in the real value of bond






This assumption ensures the stationarity of bond holdings (even for very small values of α) and thus
allows us to study the behavior of the economy in the neighborhood of a deterministic steady state.11
A representative non-asset holding household chooses consumption, CN,t, and supplies labor, HN,t,
to intermediate good ﬁrms in order to maximize its utility ﬂow on a period-by-period basis. So the












subject to the constraint that consumption expenditure equals net income
PtCN,t = WtHN,t − Tt. (8.5)
For non-asset holders, consumption equals disposable income in each period; hence they are also
referred to as ‘hand-to-mouth consumers’.
Aggregate consumption and labor supply are given by
Ct = λCN,t + (1 − λ)CA,t (8.6)
Ht = λHN,t + (1 − λ)HA,t, (8.7)
where Ht =
  1
0 Ht(j)dj is aggregate labor employed by domestic intermediate good ﬁrms.
11Our particular speciﬁcation draws on Kollmann (2002), who studies a model similar to ours. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2003) consider a real model of a small open economy and suggest the above mechanism of a debt-elastic interest rate as
one among several ways of ‘closing small open economy models’ (that is, inducing stationarity) with incomplete markets.
19Regarding asset markets, we assume that foreigners do not hold domestic bonds. Market clearing for
domestic currency bonds therefore requires
(1 − λ)At − Dt = 0. (8.8)
The market for foreign currency bonds clears by Walras’ law.
8.2 Transmission with imperfect risk sharing
This section presents model simulations undereither incomplete markets, or both incomplete markets
and limited market participation, as speciﬁed above. In Appendix A, we provide a detailed list of the
equilibrium conditions used in the simulations. We maintain the same parameter values as in Section
5, except for the trade price elasticity σ. At a value of one for this elasticity (assumed above), relative
prices move in such a way that they ensure complete risk sharing even under incomplete interna-
tional asset markets, see Cole and Obstfeld (1991). Since we are interested in the sensitivity of our
results to environments with imperfect risk sharing, we set σ = 2/3, a value in the (admittedly wide)
range considered in the recent macroeconomics literature; see Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) for
further discussion. For the sake of brevity, we focus only on the case of exogenous autoregressive
spending shocks with ψG = 0 and do not examine the case of spending reversals here.
Figure 5 contrasts the results for the baseline scenario (complete ﬁnancial markets) with those ob-
tained under the assumption that international ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. As before, we posit
an exogenous increase in government spending by 1 percent of steady-state output (not shown). The
left column shows the results for the ﬂoat, while the right column shows the results for the peg.
The solid lines display the results obtained under the assumption that at the international level there
is trade in nominally non-contingent bonds only. The dashed lines display responses obtained under
the baseline scenario of complete ﬁnancial markets. Observe that the response of consumption (top
row) is somewhat higher with incomplete markets in both exchange rate regimes, corresponding to
the different dynamics of long-term real interest rates. However, from a quantitative point of view,
differences in the response of consumption and output are modest.12
8.3 Limited asset-market participation
Figure 6 contrasts results for the baseline scenario (complete ﬁnancial markets, dashed lines) with
the case of limited participation (solid lines). In this case, we assume both that the set of assets
traded across countries is restricted to trade in non-contingent bonds, and that—within a country—
access to trade in bonds is restricted, so that only a fraction 1 − λ has access to trade in bonds.
12This ﬁnding is in line with earlier research, which found that the allocation under incomplete ﬁnancial markets is quite
close to the allocation under complete markets, unless the trade price elasticity is substantially different from one on either
side, and, for the case of a high elasticity, shocks are persistent or follow a diffusion process; see Corsetti et al. (2008).













































































Figure 5: Effect of government spending shock under complete and incomplete international ﬁnancial
markets. Notes: solid (dashed) lines display responses assuming incomplete (complete) ﬁnancial
markets; output and consumption are measured in percent of steady-state output, real exchnage rate is
measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes indicate quarters.






















































































Figure 6: Effect of government spending shock under unrestricted and restricted ﬁnancial markets.
Notes: solid and dashed lines display responses assuming restricted (at the international level only
bonds are traded and λ = 1/3) and unrestricted (complete ﬁnancial markets), respectively; output and
consumption are measured in percent of steady-state output, long-term interest rates are measured in
percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes indicate quarters.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that λ = 1/3. Results for this case are displayed by the solid lines (as before,
dashed lines pertain to the baseline scenario of complete ﬁnancial markets). We report the responses
of consumption, long-term real interest rates and output to an exogenous increase in government
spending by 1 percent of GDP.
With limited asset market participation, the dynamic adjustment of consumption is quite different
compared to our results in Section 5. On impact, consumption now increases, both under the ﬂoat
and under the peg. Importantly, this is so despite the fact that the response of long-term real rates is
actually positive throughout. The reason is straightforward: in our speciﬁcation, a considerable frac-
tion of households do not have access to asset markets. Their consumption is a function of current
income and not directly linked to changesin long-term interest rates. Becauseof the strong consump-
tion response, we also ﬁnd a considerably stronger effect of government spending on output. Absent
a reversal of spending (with ψG = 0) also with these features the model thus lends support to the
22conventional wisdom: the macroeconomic transmission of ﬁscal shocks is somewhat stronger under
the peg, with an impact multiplier above one.
9 Conclusions
Does a ﬁxed exchange rate regime enhance the ability of ﬁscal policies to determine economic activ-
ity? Can small countries in the euro area expect more from ﬁscal stabilization than countries outside
the area? Decades of practice in economic policy have already qualiﬁed the afﬁrmative answers that
textbook treatments of the Mundell-Fleming model provide to these questions. In this paper we have
explored theoretical reasons for reframing the conventional wisdom in a still richer way.
Building on Corsetti et al. (2009), our analysis brings a simple insight to bear on the role of the
exchange rate regime for ﬁscal policy transmission: the effectiveness of ﬁscal stimulus depends on
the medium-term policy framework, that is, on both monetary and ﬁscal policies over the medium
term. In particular, the short-run effect of ﬁscal measures does not only depend on the exchange rate
regime and the monetary strategy more generally, but hinges also on the future ﬁscal mix. The main
message of the conventional wisdom was that one cannot assess ﬁscal stimulus independently of the
exchange rate regime. We have shown in this paper that this message needs to be extended to include
not only the monetary regime but also the medium-term ﬁscal regime.
As a result of ﬁscal and monetary interactions, the textbook rendition of the conventional wisdom
can therefore not be taken at face value. For example, as we have shown, if budget adjustments are
implemented through spending cuts in addition to tax hikes (the empirical relevance of which was
highlighted in Corsetti et al. 2009), the anticipation of future retrenchment of government spending
tends to magnify the output effects of ﬁscal expansions under ﬂexible exchange rates. However, such
anticipation has limited or no effects under a peg, as we show in the current paper. These results raise
a number of analytical, empirical and policy issues, which, properly addressed,should help deﬁne the
preconditions for successful ﬁscal stabilization.
Our analysis in this paper has abstracted from the possibility that monetary policy is constrained by
the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy rates. Recent research by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2010) and others within a closed economy context has illustrated that government spending can be
a much more effective stabilization tool when monetary policy is constrained. In that context, we
have shown in related work of ours that spending reversals of the kind analyzed in Section 7 of this
paper are likely to enhance the short-run effects of ﬁscal stimulus when the ZLB is binding, provided
that they are not phased in too early along the recovery path (Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and M¨ uller
2010a). A detailed analysis of the interaction of ﬁscal and monetary policy in a small open economy
that takes the ZLB constraint into account is certainly an important direction of research. In light of
our earlier work we conjecture that such an analysis will further strengthen the case for ﬁscal policy
23as a stabilization tool, especially under ﬂoating exchange rates.
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25A Equilibrium conditions of the linearized model
In the following we outline the linearization of the model and state the equilibrium conditions used
in the simulations. Lower-case letters denote percentage deviations from steady-state values, ‘hats’
denote deviations from steady-state values scaled by steady-state output. Throughout we assume that
variables in the rest of the world are constant. We consider the model that allows for a fraction of
households without access to asset markets (see Section 8.2), which nests the model with full asset
market participation for λ = 0.
A.1 Deﬁnitions and derivations
Price indices The law of one price, the terms of trade, the consumption price index, and, hence CPI
inﬂation can be written as
pF,t = p∗
t − et (A.1)
st = pH,t − pF,t (A.2)
pt = (1 − ω)pH,t + ωpF,t = pH,t − ωst (A.3)
πt = πH,t − ω∆st (A.4)
qt = (1 − ω)st, (A.5)
where qt measures the real exchange rate.
Intermediate good ﬁrms The production function of intermediate goods is given by Yt(j) =
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H(j)tdj = Ht. (A.8)
A ﬁrst-order approximation is given by yt = ht.






















where the second equation deﬁnes nominal marginal costs.
Linearizing (A.9) andusing the deﬁnition of price indices,one obtainsa variantof the NewKeynesian
Phillips curve (see, e.g., Gal´ ı and Monacelli 2005):
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + κmcr
t, (A.11)
where κ = (1−ξ)(1−βξ)/ξ and marginal costs are deﬁned in real terms, deﬂated with the domestic
price index
mcr
t = wt − pH,t = wr
t − ωst. (A.12)
Here wr
t = wt − pt is the real wage (deﬂated with the CPI).
Proﬁts per capita are deﬁned as follows
Υ
pc
t = PH,tYt − WtHt (A.13)
Linearized we have (deﬂate with the CPI)
ˆ Υ
r,pc




t + ht). (A.14)
Households The ﬁrst-order conditions in deviations from the steady state are familiar:
wt − pt = γcA,t + ϕhA,t (A.15)
cA,t = EtcA,t+1 −
1
γ
(rt − Etπt+1) (A.16)
Or in terms of output units (deﬁning χ ≡ G/Y ):
(1 − χ)wr
t = γˆ cA,t + (1 − χ)ϕhA,t (A.17)
ˆ cA,t = Etˆ cA,t+1 −
(1 − χ)
γ
(rt − Etπt+1) (A.18)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for non-asset holders are


















t + hN,t) − ˆ tr
t. (A.22)
The ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply is given by
(1 − χ)wr
t = γˆ cN,t + (1 − χ)ϕhN,t. (A.23)
Regarding international ﬁnancial markets, we consider as the baseline scenario a complete set of
assets.
In this case, consumption is tightly linked to the real exchange rate (see, e.g., Gal´ ı and Monacelli
2005)
γcA,t = −qt. (A.24)
Alternatively, we assume that there is trade in nominally riskless bonds only. In this case, we have to
keep track of the net foreign asset position, using the ﬂow budget constraint of asset holders
R−1
t At+1 + R−1
F,tB∗
t+1/Et + PtCA,t = At + B∗
t /Et + WtHA,t − Tt + Υt. (A.25)
Recall that Dt = (1 − λ)At, i.e., government debt is held by domestic asset holders, and that proﬁts
go to asset holders only: (1 − λ)Ψt = Ψ
pc
t . Linearization around the zero debt steady state gives
β ˆ dr
t+1/(1−λ)+βˆ br






t + ˆ Υ
r,pc
t /(1−λ), (A.26)
UIP would imply: rt − rF,t = −∆Etet+1; yet recall that interest rates on foreign currency bonds
(assuming constant world interest rates) are given by rF,t = −α
Bt+1
βY EtPt such that
rt + αβˆ br
t+1 = −∆Etet+1. (A.27)
Government Rewriting the interest rate feedback rule in terms of deviations from the steady state
(with zero inﬂation), we have under a ﬂoat
rt = φπH,t, (A.28)















ˆ gt = ρˆ gt−1 − ψG ˆ dr
t + εt (A.29)
ˆ tr
t = ψT ˆ dr
t (A.30)
Finally, the government budget constraint is given by
β ˆ dr
t+1 = ˆ dr
t + χωst + ˆ gt − ˆ tr
t. (A.31)
28Equilibrium and additional deﬁnitions Good market clearing (3.15) in terms of deviations from
steady state is given by
yt = −σ(1 − ω)ω(1 − χ)st + (1 − ω)ˆ ct − ωσ(1 − χ)st + ωˆ c∗
t + ˆ gt. (A.32)
Rearranging under the assumption that ROW variables are constant:
yt = −(2 − ω)σω(1 − χ)st + (1 − ω)ˆ ct + ˆ gt. (A.33)
Deﬁne trade balance in percent of steady state output:
TBt =








Approximatively, around the steady state we have:
  tbt = yt − ˆ ct + (1 − χ)ωst − ˆ gt. (A.35)
A.2 Equilibrium conditions used in model simulation
Optimality of household behavior implies





t + hN,t) − ˆ tr
t (L.2)
ˆ ct = λˆ cN,t + (1 − λ)ˆ cA,t (L.3)
(1 − χ)wr
t = γˆ cA,t + (1 − χ)ϕhA,t (L.4)
(1 − χ)wr
t = γˆ cN,t + (1 − χ)ϕhN,t (L.5)
ht = λhN,t + (1 − λ)hA,t (L.6)
Asset market structures differ across simulations. First, incomplete ﬁnancial markets: we need the
budget constraint of asset-holders (A.26) and the UIP condition (A.27)
β ˆ dr
t+1/(1 − λ) + βˆ br
t+1 + ˆ cA,t = ˆ dr












rt + αβˆ br
t+1 = −∆Etet+1. (L.8)
Instead, under complete markets we use the risk-sharing condition (A.24) and zero foreign bond
holdings
γˆ cA,t = −(1 − χ)qt (L.7’)
ˆ bt+1 = 0. (L.8’)




t − ωst (L.9)
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + κmcr
t (L.10)
yt = ht (L.11)
Government policies (A.28), (A.29), (A.30), government budget constraint (A.31) and market clear-
ing (A.33) are given by:
rt = φπH,t or ∆et = 0 (L.12)
ˆ tr
t = ψT ˆ dr
t (L.13)
ˆ gt = ρˆ gt−1 − ψG ˆ dr
t + εt (L.14)
β ˆ dr
t+1 = ˆ dr
t + χωst + ˆ gt − ˆ tr
t (L.15)
yt = −(1 − χ)(2 − ω)σωst + (1 − ω)ˆ ct + ˆ gt. (L.16)
Deﬁnitions for the trade balance, relative prices, inﬂation and proﬁts are given by:
tbt = yt − ˆ ct + (1 − χ)ωst − ˆ gt (L.17)
πt = πH,t − ω∆st (L.18)
∆et = (1 − ω)∆st − πt (L.19)
qt = (1 − ω)st (L.20)
ˆ Ψ
pc,r




t + ht). (L.21)
30B Key equations of the simple model
In the following we reduce the number of equations that characterize the equilibrium in order to
obtain the canonical representation used in section 3. We only consider the case λ = 0.
B.1 Dynamic IS




(1 + ω(2 − ω)(σγ − 1)
      
≡̟





(yt − ˆ gt), (B.1)
which is equation (A.24) in the main text.




(yt − ˆ gt).
This is helpful in rewriting the Euler equation
ct = Etct+1 −
1
γ




(rt − EtπH,t+1 −
ωγ
(1 − χ)̟
Et(∆yt+1 − ∆ˆ gt+1), (B.3)
where we use πt = πH,t − ω∆st in the ﬁrst equation.
Substituting for consumption gives




which is (4.1) in the main text.
B.2 Phillips curve
Consider once more marginal costs
mcr
t = wr




(yt − ˆ gt) + ϕyt
Substituting in (A.11) gives (4.2) in the main text.
31C Long-term interest rates under ﬂoating exchange rates
Here we focus on the response of long-term real interest rates in the case of exogenous government
spending. Under a ﬂoat the allocation is characterized by (4.1), (4.2) and the Taylor rule (4.3). As-
suming ψG = 0, we solve the model using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients. Assuming that
yt = φygˆ gt and πH,t = φπgˆ gt and substituting in (4.1) gives
ˆ σ(1 − ρ)φyg = −(φπ − ρ)φπg + ˆ σ(1 − ρ),
where ˆ σ ≡ γ/((1−χ)̟). This will be positiveif ̟ > 0, which in turn requires 1 > ω(2−ω)(1−σγ)
(which we assume to be satisﬁed).
Substituting in (4.2) gives
φyg =
(1 − βρ)φπg + κˆ σ
κ(ˆ σ + ϕ)
.
Combining the two expressions yields the result
φπg =
ˆ σ(1 − ρ)ϕκ
ˆ σ(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) + κ(ϕ + ˆ σ)(φπ − ρ)
> 0,
as long as ρ < 1 and φπ > 0 (which we assume throughout).
As shown in the main text (see (6.1)), an expression of long-term real interest rates is given by:
¯ rt = Et
∞  
s=0
(rt+s − πt+1+s) = Et
∞  
s=0
(rt+s − (πH,t+s+1 − ω∆st+s+1)) (C.1)
where the second equality follows from (B.2).
Given the solution of the model we have
Etrt+s = φπφπgρsˆ gt
EtπH,t+s+1 = φπgρs+1ˆ gt
Et∆st+s+1 = ˆ σ(1 − φyg)(ρ − 1))ρsˆ gt,
where the last relationship follows from (B.1). Substituting in (C.1) gives (after some algebra)
¯ rt =
(1 − ω)(φπ − ρ)φπg
1 − ρ       
>0
ˆ gt, (C.2)
i.e., long-term rates always increase in response to governmentspending innovations under a ﬂoat (as
long as ψG = 0).
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